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CONSENT TO SEARCH IN RESPONSE TO POLICE THREATS TO SEEK OR
TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT: SOME ALTERNATIVES
Courts have recognized that when police make
"suggestions" to citizens, the citizens often do not
consent freely to the police requests, but instead
respond out of fear or coercion.' For this reason,
the Supreme Court held in Bumper v. North Carolina2
that a search made pursuant to a warrant "cannot
later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns
out that the warrant was invalid."3 The Court
reasoned that "[w]hen a law enforcement officer
claims authority to search a home under a warrant,
he announces in effect that the occupant has no
right to resist the search. The situation is instinct
with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."4
Another situation in which consent may have
been obtained coercively is when police, seeking
consent to search, threaten to seek or to obtain a
search warrant. A citizen may believe that obtain-
ing a warrant is a nondiscretionary procedure and
therefore may "consent" to the search. The consent
in such a situation may be no more voluntary,
however, than the "consent" obtained after a police
officer presents a warrant. In both situations, the
citizen may be responding out of a belief of inev-
itability rather than out of a free decision to allow
the search.
Because of the potential for coercion in consent
searches and because the Supreme Court has not
decided whether searches conducted after these
types of police threats are coercive, there is a need
to examine what case law there is on this issue.
More importantly, there is a need to examine
whether there are alternatives to this type of search.
THE CASE LAW ON THE CONSENT SEARCH
Although searches generally are to be conducted
pursuant to a valid search warrant,5 search war-
'See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651
(D.C. Cir. 1951) (consent given after being jailed and
questioned for several hours by police); J. Clarke, The
Robber, the Police and the Fourth Amendment 134
(April 1974) (unpublished thesis in Northwestern Uni-
versity Law Library).
2 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
3 Id. at 549 (footnote omitted).
4 Id. at 550.
' See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967) ("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial proc-
ess, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are
rants actually have played a comparatively minor
role in law enforcement 6 because of the many
exceptions made to the general rule.7 One excep-
tion to the warrant rule is the consent search, which
occurs when the occupant of the premises consents
to a search. s This exception has attained popularity
among the police because they believe that the
procedure for obtaining a search warrant is too
technical and time consuming while not affording
the individual any increased protection. In addi-
tion, the restrictions on the other types of excep-
tions to the warrant requirement 0 have made the
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and well-defined
exceptions.") (footnotes omitted); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right ofprivacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,
to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.").
6 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, com-
mentary at 493 (1975) (conclusion based on 1961-66
data).
7 A detailed examination of some of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement is found in Haddad, Well-Delin-
eated Exceptions, Claims of Sham and Fourfold Probable Cause,
68J. CRIM. L. & C. 198 (1977). For a discussion of all the
exceptions to the warrant requirement, see W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978).
SE.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946);
United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1963);
Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir.
1960); State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1979); State
v. Nicholson, 225 Kan. 418, 590 P.2d 1069 (1979); An-
not., 36 L. Ed. 2d 1143 (1972). But see United States v.
Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954). For a discussion
of consent searches in general, see J. COOK, CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: PRETRIAL RIGrrs § 50
(1972).
9 P. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERO, DETEC-
TION OF CRIME 159 (1967).
1°See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
(warrant required prior to searching luggage taken from
an automobile properly stopped and searched for contra-
band); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1979) (serious-
ness of offense under investigation does not create exigent
circumstance such that warrantless search is justified);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1979) (warrant
required when search remote in time and place from
arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(limiting Carroll automobile searches); Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest limited
to immediate area).
COMMENTS
consent search a more attractive alternative for
police.'"
Increased use of the consent search exception
merits careful scrutiny of the circumstances sur-
rounding consent to search. Because the person
who consents to a search relinquishes constitutional
protection, 2 consent must be given freely and vol-
untarily.' 3 In order to meet its burden of proving
valid consent,14 the state must show that there were
no factors present which, in their totality, might
have forced the occupant to consent.'
5
Although the decisions hold that the mere pres-
ence of a police officer is not so coercive that it will
invalidate consent to search, 6 the courts have
found that certain statements made by police do
force a citizen to "consent." For example, if an
officer declares, "I have come here to search your
house," this will be viewed as coercive.17 Consent
" It once was believed that the consent search played
a relatively minor role in law enforcement. See MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, commentary at
492-93 (1975).
1
2 The fourth amendment protects citizens against
warrantless searches. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
13See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968); Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966); Simmons v.
Bomar, 349 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1965): Judd v. United
States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Kovach v. United
States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
14 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 548-50. See
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
"'See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249
(1973): Flournoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 171, 172, 205
S.E.2d 473, 474 (1974).
'
6 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973); Consumer Credit Ins. Agency v. United
States, 599 F.2d 770 (6th Cir. 1979) (consent to delivery
of subpoenas); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275
(E.D. Mo. 1944); People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224
N.W.2d 867, cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975); Note,
Consent Searches-Relinquishment of Fourth Amendment
Rights-The Need For A Warning, 5 GONz. L. REv. 315, 317
(1970). Cf note 59 infra (cases where presence of police is
considered).
However, "true consent, free of fear or pressure, is not
so readily to be found" in any setting involving police.
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir.
1951). One court ruled that, where circumstances of
consent were not clear, it would assume that the presence
of police made it impossible for a suspect to freely consent
to search even in the absence of force. Lee v. United
States, 232 F.2d 354, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also United
States v. McCunn, 40 F.2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
17See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
(coercion where defendant consented after officer said,
"I want to talk to you a bit."); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1921) (coercion where revenue officers said
they had come to search premises for violations of revenue
is generally invalid if it was based on a law officer's
untrue statement, 8 if it was made in situations
where an average person would believe his only
option was to consent,' 9 or if it occurred in response
to implied or express police threats." In all of these
law); Ferrara v. State, 319 So. 2d 629 (Fla. App. 1975)
(coercion where officers told defendant that they were
going to search his apartment); State v. Ahern, 227
N.W.2d 164 (Iowa 1975) (coercion when police kicked
door down); People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 118
N.W.2d 406 (1962) (coercion where detective stated that
he would search whether defendant consented or not).
IS See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931) (police falsely claimed to have a
warrant); United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1035
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1978) (federal
agent told defendant that she should consent because
narcotics found in her car could not be used in court);
United States v. Kampbell, 574 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1978)
(investigator threatened that defendant's home could be
ransacked under a search warrant); United States v.
Sclafini, 265 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
918 (1959) (consent after agents told taxpayer that no
proceedings would eventuate from search); State v. Bar-
row, 320 A.2d 895 (Me. 1974) (police incorrectly told
defendant that they could search the car without a
warrant if they saw anything suspicious through the
window). Cf Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970) (consent to blood test invalid
when police deceived defendant as to purpose of test). But
cf. Commonwealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879
(1970) (deception as to use of gun acquired by undercover
agent does not violate defendant's fourth amendment
rights).
Professor LaFave believes that police officers' deliber-
ate attempts to deceive a person by falsely claiming to
have a warrant constitutes "a gross and deliberate effort
to thwart Fourth Amendment protections [and]
deserve[s] to be dealt with ... severely." 2 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 7, at 640 n.15.
'9 See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)
(implied coercion where federal agents told defendant's
wife that they had come to search premises for violations
of the revenue law); United States v. Hall, 468 F. Supp.
123 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (officers knocking loudly and per-
sistently on door and demanding entry); In re 2029 Her-
ring St., 464 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (layperson
granting consent after having been told earlier that her
consent was not needed because the officers had a search
warrant). Contra, People v. Stock, 56 Ill. 2d 461, 309
N.E.2d 19 (1974) (subjective feeling that refusal to con-
sent would be futile does not negate consent).
2o See, e.g., United States v. Kampbell, 574 F.2d 962
(8th Cir. 1978) (threat that home could be ransacked
under a warrant); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554
(7th Cir. 1975) (threat to arrest girlfriend); Waldron v.
United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (officers said
that if they had to get a warrant they would not be
responsible for what would happen to the defendant's
apartment); In re Nwamu, 421 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (threats of contempt, in part, used to enforce
[Vol. 71
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situations, the statements voided the consent and
invalidated the search.
THE BUMPER ANALOGY
MAJORITY VIEW OF BUMPER
The majority of courts, however, have upheld
consent to search in response to police statements
threatening to seek or to obtain a search warrant.21
subpoena duces tecum); Lightford v. State, 90 Nev. 136,
520 P.2d 955 (1974) (police talked about kicking in the
door if defendant did not consent); Paprskar v. State, 484
S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (defendant's wife
subjected to physical abuse, show of arms, and sur-
rounded by a "veritable posse").
21 See, e.g., People v. Magby, 37 Il. 2d 197, 226 N.E.2d
33 (1967) (consent valid where officer told defendant: "If
you don't care to let us search, we'll get a warrant.').
Many cases imply that where law enforcement officers
indicate that they will attempt to obtain or are getting a
warrant, such a statement cannot serve to vitiate an
otherwise consensual search. United States v. Culp, 472
F.2d 459, 461 n.1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970
(1973). See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 459 F.2d 60, 61
(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (police said they could get
a warrant); United States ex rel. Gockley v. Meyers, 378
1 2d 398, 399 (3d Cir. 1967) (police told defendant that
they were going to get a search warrant); Gatterdam v.
United States, 5 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1925) (officer
said: "You might as well consent, because, if you do not,
we will go and get a search warrant.'); United States v.
Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
af/'d, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947
(1971) (officer said he intended to obtain a warrant);
United States v. Fitzpatrick, 289 F. Supp. 767, 772 (D.
Utah 1968) (agents said they had a right to and would
get a search warrant whether or not defendant con-
sented); Hamilton v. State, 260 F. Supp. 632, 633
(E.D.N.C. 1966) (police threatened to get a warrant);
Simmons v. Bomar, 230 F. Supp. 226, 228 (M.D. Tenn.
1964), affd, 349 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(officer said: "[Y]ou want to let us search and look around
or do you want part of us to go get a warrant and some
of us to stay until they get back with a warrant?"):
Kershner v. Boles, 212 F. Supp. 9, 10 (N.D.W. Va. 1963)
(officer told defendant he could get a warrant); United
States v. Haas, 106 F. Supp. 295, 296 (W.D. Pa. 1952)
(police threat to get a warrant); People v. Ward, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 218, 225-26, 103 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675-76 (1972)
(officers said that if defendant did not consent they would
have to apply for a search warrant and possibly would
get it); People v. Rupar, 244 Cal. App. 2d 292, 295, 53
Cal. Rptr. 70, 71 (1966) (policeman said his partner
would go and get a warrant); Barlow v. State, 280 A.2d
703 (Del. 1971) (officer said he could get a warrant within
a short time); State v. Yoss, 146 Mont. 508, 513,409 P.2d
452, 455 (1965) (policeman said: "Either you sign [the
consent form] or we will go to Court anyway and get a
search warrant to search your house."): State v. Hamil-
ton, 264 N.C. 277, 281, 141 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1020 (1966) (officer said he could get a
warrant): State v. Douglas, 488 P.2d 1366, 1373-75 (Or.
These decisions are based on a patchwork of ra-
tionales. Some consider the words used by the
officer;22 others look at all the circumstances23 or
find the presence of probable cause to obtain a
search warrant to be determinative.2s Still others
uphold a threat when it was made in response to
questions by the occupants, or they simply view all
threats to seek or to obtain warrants as informa-
tive.25 Many simply fail to address the possibility
that a police threat is coercive.
26
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974 (1972) (officer said he
would apply for or attempt to get a warrant); Thurman
v. State, 455 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971) (police advised defendant
that they could get a warrant). But see United States v.
Minor, 117 F. Supp. 697, 698 (E.D. Okla. 1953); United
States v. Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
Upholding consent in response to police threat to seek
a warrant: United States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d 537 (5th
Cir. 1969) (policeman said that he would attempt to get
a warrant); People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d
435 (1974) (officers told defendant that if he did not
consent a warrant could and would be sought); State v.
Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D. 1977) (officer said he
would present evidence to judge but he could not predict
whether a warrant would be issued). See also Common-
wealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa. 249, 253, 297 A.2d 471, 474
(1972) (officer said he probably could get a warrant).
Upholding consent when police officer unequivocably
states that he will obtain a warrant: United States v.
Bracer, 342 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954
(1965) (agents told defendants that they were going to
get a search warrant); United States v. Kohn, 365 F.
Supp. 1031 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd, 495 F.2d 763 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974) (officer said
he had the right to get a search warrant). But see State v.
Lewis, 80 N.M. 274, 277, 454 P.2d 360, 363 (1969); Poe
v. Oklahoma City, 483 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971). Cf. Losieau v. Sigler, 421 F.2d 825, 827 (8th
Cir. 1970) (consent obtained at gunpoint after officers
stated that there was a search warrant at the police
station and they could get it if necessary).
Similarly, consent is valid if an officer states that he
will seek a warrant and believes that it will be issued. See
United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1974).
For an analysis based on the language of the threat,
see text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
23 See text accompanying notes 46-62 infra.
24 See text accompanying notes 63-73 infra.
25 See text accompanying note 68 infra.
26 See United States ex rel. Gockley v. Meyers, 378 F.2d
398, 399 (3d Cir. 1967) (police told defendant that they
were going to get a search warrant); Gatterdam v. United
States, 5 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1925) (officer stated:
"You might as well consent, because, if you do not, we
will go and get a search warrant'); Hamilton v. State,
260 F. Supp. 632, 633 (E.D.N.C. 1966) (police threatened
to get a warrant); Simmons v. Bomar, 230 F. Supp. 226,
229 (M.D. Tenn. 1964), aftid, 349 F.2d 365 (6th Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (officer said: "[Y]ou want to let us
1980]
The courts adopting these rationales view the
Bumper decision as inapplicable to cases in which
the police threatened to obtain a warrant.2 7 In
Bumper, the Court found coercion when police
claimed to possess a warrant.28 Because a warrant
grants the police authority to search regardless of
consent, reliance on consent to search is inappro-
priate when a warrant is present if the warrant is
later held unlawful. 29 By contrast, these courts
argue, where no warrant is present, the officer is
acting within his rights when he seeks to obtain a
warrant.30 Thus, a citizen is giving consent in
response to a police threat to do what the police
officer is legally able to do.
3 '
A BROADER VIEW OF BUMPER
A broader view of Bumper, however, shows a
strong similarity between cases in which the police
already have a warrant and those in which the
police merely threaten to obtain one. In Bumper,
the Court found consent was obtained coercively
because "[w]hen a law enforcement official claims
authority to search a home under a warrant, he
announces in effect that the occupant has no right
to resist the search., 3 2 In such a situation, the
citizen will permit the search because he views the
search as inevitable in light of the warrant. Like-
wise, when a police officer threatens to seek or to
obtain a warrant, the police threat may lead the
citizen to believe that the search is inevitable.
Because the premise underlying the consent in both
cases is the inevitability of the search, both situa-
tions are inherently coercive. 33 The only difference
search and look around or do you want part of us to go
get a warrant and some of us to stay until they get back
with a warrant?"); Kersher v. Boles, 212 F. Supp. 9, 10
(N.D.W. Va. 1963) (officer told defendant he could get
a warrant); United States v. Haas, 106 F. Supp. 295, 296
(W.D. Pa. 1952) (police threat to get a warrant); People
v. Rupar, 244 Cal. App. 2d 292, 295, 53 Cal. Rptr. 70, 71
(1966) (officer said he would wait and his partner would
get a warrant); State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 281,
141 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1020
(1966) (officer said he could get a warrant): Thurman v.
State, 455 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971) (police advised defendant that
they could obtain a warrant).27 See cases cited in notes 23-26 supra.
28 391 U.S. at 550.
2Id. at 549.
"o See, e.g., People v. Rupar, 244 Cal. App. 2d 292, 298,
53 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (1966).
31 Id.
32 391 U.S. at 550.
33 Courts have held consent vitiated in other situations
where it appeared that to do otherwise would be useless.
between the claim of authority in Bumper and the
police threat to obtain a warrant is one of imme-
diacy. The perception of inevitability may be the
same whether the claim of lawful authority is
perceived to emanate from the search warrant or
from the police officer's words.
This interpretation of Bumper focuses on the con-
senting individual's subjective reaction to the po-
lice threat or statement, not on the statement it-
self.34 Thus, Bumper does not control a situation
where a person acquiesces to a search without
basing consent on a police officer's claim of lawful
authority. For example, where citizens, upon being
served with search warrants, have told officials that
they need not read or show them the warrant and
that they are free to search, courts have upheld the
subsequent searches based on consent.35 The ra-
tionale is that the particular individual was not
coerced by the policeman's warrant.
Because the key in Bumper is the individual's
subjective reaction to the police statements, a court
addressing a situation in which police threatened
to seek a warrant should examine the individual's
subjective reaction to the threat before it finds
consent. While it is true that some individuals are
able to consent freely after such threats, not all do.
Alternatives to the majority approach of finding
valid consent must be developed to deal with those
cases in which individuals are coerced by threats
to seek a warrant.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In fashioning these alternatives, care must be
taken to avoid the inconsistency and the confusion
which have plagued fourth amendment analysis.
36
Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973) (defend-
ant could see that police had control over her home and
had obtained incriminating evidence); People v. Clark
Memorial Home, 114 Ill. App. 2d 249, 252 N.E.2d 546
(1969) (officers gained entry when patrons left automatic
door open and gambling equipment in plain view upon
entry).
3 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1971), ceft.
denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Earls v. State, 496 S.W.2d
464 (Tenn. 1973), petition for habeas corpus relief denied, 379
F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
5 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Earls v. Tennessee, 379 F.
Supp. 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
36 Justices of the Supreme Court have been quite cog-
nizant of the inconsist2ncies in fourth amendment doc-
trine. "This branch of the law is something less than a
seamless web." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440
(1973). "The decisions of the Supreme Court involving
the fourth amendment are hardly notable for their pre-
dictability." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45 (1963)
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In addition, the alternatives must take into account
the fact that the Supreme Court recently has fa-
vored a balancing approach in fourth amendment
cases.37 Because of the rather drastic results of the
exclusionary rule,s8 this balance often favors tra-
ditional law enforcement.3 9 Therefore, in line with
these concerns, the following alternatives supply
added protection to the citizens granting consent
without significantly interfering with traditional
law enforcement functions.
The Semantic Distinction Approach. An approach
suggested by at least one court is to look at the
actual words spoken by the police officer to deter-
mine whether coercion is present.40 For example, if
an officer says he will "get" a warrant rather than
"apply for" a warrant, he may give the citizen the
impression that the issuance of a warrant is a
nondiscretionary process.4 The citizen's consent in
such a case is given in response to an implicit claim
of authority. The situation resembles cases where
consent was vitiated by untruthful statements by
police4 2 because the police officer's failure to com-
municate that the warrant process is discretionary
deceives the citizen.
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit best stated
the rationale of the semantic distinction approach:
[W]ords spoken in the process of obtaining consent
to waiver of a constitutional right ought to be
chosen with care. The officers are not proceeding in
haste to make a split second decision of their au-
thority to apprehend a fleeing suspect. They face a
situation that normally calls for a delay necessary
(Harlan, J., concurring). "The course of true law pertain-
ing to search and seizure has not-to put it mildly-run
smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5
7 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55
(1979).
3s Often the exclusion of evidence will result in an
obviously guilty defendant going free even though he
committed the most despicable of crimes. See Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,555 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Traynor has written: "Of all the two-faced prob-
lems in the law, there is none more tormenting than that
posed by the exclusionary rule." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at
Large in the Fiy States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 319.
°Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228
(1973).
4o United States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d 537, 538 (5th
Cir. 1969) (upholding consent when police officer said
that he would attempt to get a warrant, but indicating
that the search might have been held invalid if the officer
had said that he would get a warrant).41
id.
42 See note 18 supra.
to obtain a search warrant. If they are to forego the
requirement, it should not be too much to ask that
they take care not to confront the accused with a
choice that totally obliterates the important protec-
tive function of the warrant-issuing process.4
Because this approach emphasizes police use of
a word indicating the discretionary nature of war-
rant proceedings, it is useful only if the citizen
views the distinction between "get" and "apply
for" as meaningful. Certainly, some perceptive cit-
izens will note the distinction. For them, the se-
mantic distinction approach makes sense because
if it is presumed that if they are aware of the
element of discretion, they will consent only if they
truly want to do so.
However, many citizens will not recognize or
will not accord any value to the difference in
semantics. These citizens still will perceive the
search as inevitable and likely will conclude that
standing on one's constitutional rights and refusing
to consent to a search would be futile and counter-
productive. Just as "a reasonable person might
read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous expression
of demand backed by the force of law," 44 so too
might "seeking" a warrant be equated with "ob-
taining" a warrant.
Furthermore, the semantic approach creates ev-
identiary problems. Placing undue emphasis on
the words used at the time of the search is inappro-
priate because later testimony is subject to fading
memories.45 Neither the citizen nor the police offi-
cer is likely to be able to recall the exact words
uttered, yet it is the exact words that must be
43 United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495-98 (2d
Cir. 1974) (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman,
however, would not establish the semantic distinction
approach as a separate and dispositive test. See text
accompanying note 55 infra.
44 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275-76
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45 Fading memories are often colored with individual
desires. For example, in the case of a consent search,
[a] homeowner who invites the police to make a
search which turns out contrary to his interests will
probably regret having made the invitation; and he
may slide easily from wishing he had not done so to
believing he did not. He will slide even more easily
if it is not claimed that he invited the inspection
but only acceded to a request. On the other hand,
a police officer who is eager to search may convince
himself easily that the homeowner had consented,
and even more easily recall the consent after he has
found what he was looking for.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHli. L.
REv. 47, 55 (1974).
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remembered if semantic nuances are to be given
significance.
Totality of the Circumstances Test. Some other courts
determine the voluntariness of a consent made in
response to a police threat to seek or to obtain a
search warrant by looking at the totality of the
46circumstances surrounding the consent. This test
is based on the Supreme Court's holding in Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte47 that "the question of whether a
consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or im-
plied, is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of the circumstances., 48 One of the
most marked examples of the application of this
test was provided by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Kohn.49 In Kohn, the police gave Miranda
warnings50 to the suspect, and he indicated that he
knew about the process of obtaining a warrant. 5i
The court held that these factors offset the agents'
assertion that they had the "right" to get a warrant
and would secure the premises, leave a guard, and
return with a warrant in the morning if consent
were not given.
52
The totality of the circumstances test incorpo-
rates a number of approaches.5 3 The threat to seek
or to obtain a search warrant may be a factor
weighing in favor of a determination of involun-
tariness.54 Judge Newman suggests giving substan-
46 
See, e.g., United States v. Faroulo, 506 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Kohn, 495 F.2d 763 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974); United
States v. Bracer, 342 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 954 (1965).
47 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
48 Id. at 228.
49365 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afj'd, 495 F.2d
763 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965
(1974). The Second Circuit consistently applies the "to-
tality of the circumstances" test. See United States v.
Faroulo, 506 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bracer, 342 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954
(1965).
50 Miranda warnings were weighed within the totality
of the circumstances in People v. Griffin, 53 Ill. App. 3d
294, 368 N.E.2d 738 (1977).
5i Prior to Schneckloth, California courts required the
citizen to do something affirmative to indicate his reluc-
tance to cooperate with the police to establish submission
to authority. See Note, The Need for a Warning Prior to
Waiver of the Fourth Amendment, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 205,
211 (1969).
52365 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 506
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 Professor Weinreb suggests that only when there is
probable cause and an emergency should consent to
search be upheld. See Weinreb, note 45 supra, at 57-58.
"' United States v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 729 (6th Cir.
1977); People v. Ward, 27 Cal. App. 3d 218, 225-26, 103
Cal. Rptr. 671, 675-76 (1972).
tial weight to semantics within the framework of
this test.s5 Moreover, a warning, even though not
required,57 could be held to offset the coercive effect
of the threat.s8 In addition, this approach allows
for consideration of the number of officers pres-
ent,5 9 whether the officers making the threat had
probable cause to search,6° and other factors that
may make the threat more or less coercive.
A serious defect in the totality of circumstances
test, though, is that, as with any balancing ap-
proach, there is a great problem in determining
what should be weighed in the balance and what
weight should be given to each factor. There are
no guidelines for what words are coercive and in
what setting they are coercive. Moreover, there is
no way to judge which coercive statements are
more important than others.6 1
5 United States v. Faroulo, 506 F.2d 490, 498 (2d Cir.
1974) (Newman, J., concurring).
For a suggested warning, see text accompanying
note 79 infra.
5' 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973).
5 Some courts hold the absence of warnings to be an
important factor under the totality of the circumstances.
See, e.g., United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974); United States v.
DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973).
59See, e.g., United States v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 729 (6th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); United States v.
Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1974); Harless v.
Turner, 456 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1972); People v. Blitz,
38 Ill. App. 3d 419, 347 N.E.2d 764 (1976), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 974 (1978); People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122,
347 N.E.2d 575, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 215 (1976); Lowery v.
State, 499 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
" E.g., United States v. Scheiblauer, 472 F.2d 297 (9th
Cir. 1973) (defendant already admitted suitcase con-
tained marijuana); Code v. State, 234 Ga. 90, 214 S.E.2d
873 (1975) (car matching witness' description of car
involved in robbery found parked in front of defendant's
home); State v. Rathburn, 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W.2d
253 (1976) (policeman had probable cause to search
automobile because he smelled odor of burned mari-
juana); State v. Raynor, 27 N.C. App. 538, 219 S.E.2d
657 (1975) (informant supplying probable cause to sup-
port search warrant).
The rationale supporting inclusion of probable cause
and its drawbacks are considered in detail in the next
section.
61 According to Professor LaFave:
[I]t can seldom be said with confidence that a
particular combination of factors will inevitably
ensure a finding of either consent or no consent.
This is because of (i) the inherent ambiguity of the
voluntariness test and (ii) the resulting freedom of
trial and appellate courts to inject their own values
into the decision process while purporting to follow
the dictates of the Supreme Court.
2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 638.
Professor Weinreb believes that the totality of the
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More importantly, Bumper does not advocate
merely weighing the factors. Instead, it invalidates
consent given pursuant to a policeman's claim of
lawful authority.6 2 When consent in response to a
police threat to seek or to obtain a warrant is
premised on the belief that the search is inevitable,
the implied claim of authority alone should inval-
idate consent. Determination of the voluntariness
of consent based on the totality of the circum-
stances does not give the individual enough protec-
tion.
Examination of the Basis for the Police Threat to Seek
or to Obtain a Search Warrant. Because the broad
Bumper analogy hinges upon the belief that a search
is inevitable, the basis for that belief is crucial.
Under the basis-examination approach, consent
obtained in response to a police threat is valid only
when the police actually had probable cause suf-
ficient to support the issuance of a warrant.0 To
obtain a search warrant, an officer must satisfy the
court that probable cause exists.6 However, when
an officer threatens to seek or to obtain a search
warrant, the officer may or may not have probable
cause at that time to support the issuance of a
warrant. If the citizen consents to such a search,
the consent probably is premised on the belief that
the issuance of a warrant is a nondiscretionary
procedure and, therefore, that the search inevitably
will occur.65 Citizens, who in the absence of a threat
would not consent, are likely to consent in response
to such threat. If the officer making the threat had
probable cause to support the issuance of a war-
circumstances test, "which depends on retrospective de-
termination of the consenting person's state of mind, is
unlikely to be satisfactory however ample the facts upon
which the determination is based. It will not provide
convincing distinctions among cases that are decided
differently." Weinreb, supra note 45, at 58.
6 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
63 While there are a number of cases upholding consent
in response to a police threat to seek or obtain a warrant
where officers had probable cause, these cases ostensibly
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding,
consent. Consequently, the basis-examination approach
may not be a distinct test as applied by the courts. See
note 60 supra.
6 The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part:
"[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable cause ......
U.S. CONSTr. amend. IV.
6 Courts have voiced a concern that police will per-
suade the individual that "insistence upon fourth amend-
ment guarantees will secure for him merely a delay of
the inevitable search rather than the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure to which he is constitu-
tionally entitled." Herriot v. State, 337 So. 2d 165, 168
(Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (quoting Whitman v. State, 25
Md. App. 428, 456, 336 A.2d 515, 531 (1975)).
rant, the citizen's perception that the search is
inevitable is correct, so the threat is not deceptive.
He either must consent in response to the police
threat to seek or to obtain a warrant or later be
compelled to allow a search pursuant to a warrant.
Under the basis-examination approach, if prob-
able cause is present, then the citizen is afforded
protection equal to that which would have been
provided by an impartial magistrate. If, however,
the police threat was made without probable cause,
then the consent is invalid and the resulting evi-
dence is excluded.* For example, one court upheld
the validity of consent given in response to a police
threat to obtain a warrant to search luggage which
the defendant had admitted contained mari-
juana.6 7 The rationale is that such threats are
informative when they are based upon probable
cause and when the citizen is told that he need not
consent to the search.68 Consent is invalid, however,
when police threats are made in the absence of
probable cause because such threats are only coer-
cive.6a While the Supreme Court has recognized a
need for accepting consent to search even when no
probable cause to search exists,7' it has not specif-
ically decided whether probable cause is needed
when the consent is given in response to a police
threat to obtain a warrant.
This approach might deter officers from
threatening to obtain warrants if no probable cause
existed or searching if they lacked probable cause
and consent was given only in response to a
6 See, e.g., Flournoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 171, 205
S.E.2d 473 (1974). The Flournoy court held that the
absence of probable cause made the police threat coer-
cive. Unlike cases where probable cause is present, the
totality of the circumstances appear not to be considered.
67 United States v. Scheiblauer, 472 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.
1973).
68 United States v. Faroulo, 506 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Savage, 459 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); People v. Magby, 37 Ill. 2d 197, 226
N.E.2d 33 (1967); People v. Griffin, 53 Ill. App. 3d 294,
368 N.E.2d 738 (1977).
6 See, e.g., Herriott v. State, 337 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1976); Flournoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 171, 205
S.E.2d 473 (1974). Contra, United States v. Curiale, 414
F.2d 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969);
Thurman v. State, 455 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971). In both Curiale and
Thurman, the courts held consent valid in the absence of
probable cause.
70 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)
("In situations where the police have some evidence of
illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search,
a search authorized by valid consent may be the only
means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.")
(footnote omitted).
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threat.7 ' This positive result would protect citizens
who mistakenly believe that a search is inevitable.
On the other hand, this approach might lead
police to threaten citizens with the possibility of
obtaining a search warrant whenever the citizen
refuses consent but probable cause is present. Con-
sent in reponse to such a threat correctly would be
premised on the inevitability of the search. In a
sense, such threats would be informative. But the
informative aspect of the threat-that the search
really is inevitable-is woefully incomplete. To
permit police to threaten citizens to encourage
waiver of constitutional rights properly falls outside
traditional law enforcement values. 72 In addition,
a retrospective rather than a prospective determi-
nation of the presence of probable cause invites
abuse, particularly when admissibility of evidence
is dependent on the preexistence of probable
cause.7 3 The number and magnitude of the prob-
lems with the examination of basis approach make
it unsatisfactory.
Prohibition of Consent Search in Response to Police
Threat to Obtain a Warrant. An approach currently
not employed by any jurisdiction is to prohibit all
consent searches in response to police threats to
obtain a warrant. Those who support this approach
agree that no one would consent to a search when
he believed that evidence incriminating himself
would be found 74 unless he believed that the
threatened search was inevitable. The number of
cases in which incriminating evidence is found
71 An officer knowing that evidence will be excluded
will be deterred from threatening. The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to prevent such infringements of
individual rights. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
72 Although "[t]he circumstances that prompt the ini-
tial request to search may develop or be a logical exten-
sion of investigative police questioning," to allow police
to threaten citizens comes seriously close to giving them
"carte blanche to extract what they can from a suspect"
and, therefore, would seem to fall outside traditional law
enforcement functions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. at 218, 225.
73 Such a procedure would bypass "the safeguards
provided by an objective predetermination of probable
cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable proce-
dure of an after-the-event justification for the ... search,
too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar short-
comings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964). See generally LaFave & Remington, Control-
ling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 MicH. L. REv. 987 (1965).
7 United States v. Curiale, 414 F.2d 744 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969) (defendant consented to search
when stolen dimes were hidden in rear room of building
under platform).
easily by police immediately after consent in re-
sponse to threats to seek or to obtain a warrant
75
indicates that acquiesence to search in many cases
is premised on inevitability. Because the officer
cannot be certain that a warrant will issue, the
citizen's acquiesence is misplaced. Protection of the
individual consenting to a search in response to a
police threat, it may be argued, can only be af-
forded effectively by eliminating this branch of the
consent search exception altogether.
Unlike prohibition of consent searches, the pro-
hibition of police threats to seek or to obtain search
warrants would not interfere with traditional law
enforcement functions of police.76 Whereas the con-
sent search comes within the ambit of traditional
police investigatory techniques, 77 police threats to
seek or to obtain warrants do not comport with the
modern view of police professionalism. 78 Similarly,
in the typical consent search situation, the citizen
might have an interest in saving himself the time,
aggravation, and unnecessary "embarrassment to
himself and to his friends or neighbors who might
be questioned as the result of suspicion." 79 This
interest is not likely to be the controlling consider-
ation in granting consent only after a police threat.
If such aggravations were paramount, it would
seem likely that consent, given an opportunity,
would precede the threat. In the absence of policy
reasons supporting the encouragement of police
threats to citizens, even a mere possibility of coer-
cion supports prohibition.
By forbidding officers with probable cause from
threatening citizens with the perceived inevitability
of a search pursuant to a warrant, this approach
has several benefits not shared by the three other
alternatives already discussed. Unlike the semantic
distinction approach, prohibition affords the less
perceptive citizen protection identical with that of
75 United States v. Savage, 459 F.2d 60, 61 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 289 F.
Supp. 767 (D. Utah 1968); Barlow v. State, 280 A.2d 703
(Del. 1971); State v. Douglas, 488 P.2d 1366, 1373-75
(Or. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974 (1972); State v.
Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D. 1977); Thurman v. State,
455 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 938 (1971).
76 One court would significantly narrow the consent
search exception. United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d
630 (7th Cir. 1954).
77 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32
(1973).
78 See generally A. NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD
27-32 (1967).
'9 Note, Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights,
12 ST. Louis L.J. 297, 306 (1967).
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a person who perceives every semantic nuance.
Prohibition eliminates the uncertainty of the case-
by-case analysis resulting from a totality of the
circumstances approach, and it provides prospec-
tive protection to the citizen rather than a reliance
on a retrospective examination of the basis for the
police threat. In the absence of a warning that
would negate the potential coercive effect of the
police threat, prohibition of consent search follow-
ing a police threat to seek or to obtain a warrant is
the best approach.
Required Warnings. Another possible alternative is
to require officers to accompany all threats to seek
or to obtain search warrants with a warning that
consent need not be given. To minimize the possi-
bility that the citizen would perceive that the
search is inevitable, such a warning would empha-
size the discretionary nature of the procedure of
obtaining search warrants.
Extensive warnings would not be necessary to
effectuate this protection.'a This author suggests
the following warning:
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search
your home, and if you decide to refuse, I will go to
court and apply for a search warrant. You should
understand that I cannot be certain that a warrant
will or will not be issued. The judge will determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that there
is contraband or evidence of a crime within your
home. The issuance of a warrant is entirely within
the discretion of the judge.
In the years after Miranda, commentators have
urged that warnings should be required prior to
consent searches.81 The warnings are necessary, it
80 For an example of a more limited warning as applied
to consent searches, see the model code instruction, note
83 infra.
81 E.g., Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights,
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note,
Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1967); Note, supra note 16; Note,
supra note 79; Note, supra note 51.
The Columbia note proposed the following warning:
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search
your home, and if you decide to refuse, I will respect
your refusal. If you do decide to let me search, you
won't be able to change your mind later on, and
during the search I'll be able to look in places and
take things that I couldn't even if I could get a
search warrant. You have a right to a lawyer before
you decide, and if you can't afford a lawyer we will
get one for you and you won't have to pay for him.
There are many different laws which are designed
to protect you from my searching, but they are too
complicated for me to explain or for you to under-
stand, so if you think you would like to take advan-
is argued, because the fourth and fifth amendments
"run almost into each other."2 The Model Penal
Code already requires that a warning be given
prior to a consent search,83 and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for decades has given such warn-
ings before obtaining consent to search.8& Further-
more, one court has found that giving warnings
prior to consent searches does not impair the effec-
tiveness of the police.s8
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has re-
stricted the situations in which Miranda-type warn-
ings are required8 6 and has even rejected a require-
tage of this very important information you will
need a lawyer to help you before you tell me I can
search.
67 COLUM. L. REV. at 158.
Justice Goldberg's position in right to counsel cases
eloquently states the position of those who favor warnings
because consent should be intelligently given: "[N]o sys-
tem of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes
to depend on the citizens' abdication through unaware-
ness of their constitutional rights." Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
8 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). In
Boyd, Justice Bradley stated:
We have already noticed the intimate relation be-
tween the two amendments. They throw great light
on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and
seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself which in
criminal eases is condemned in the Fifth Amend-
ment ....
Id. at 633.
For a note taking this approach, see Wallenstein,
Consent Searches, 4 CRiM. L. BULL. 509 (1968).
8 "Before undertaking a search under the provisions
of this Article, an officer present shall inform the individ-
ual whose consent is sought that he is under no obligation
to give such consent and that anything found may be
taken and used in evidence." MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RATONMENT PROCEDURE § 240.2(2) (1975).
8 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
240.2, commentary at 534 (1975). See CRIMINAL DIVISION,
U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 47-48 (1968); Note, Consent Searches:
A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 81, at 143
(referring to a letter from J. Edgar Hoover on file in the
Columbia Law Library).
8 See In re Santos, 400 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Pa. 1975)
(warning given to suspects without impairing effective-
ness of the police). See also United States v. Miller, 395
F.2d 116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968).
8 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)
(defendant not in custody within meaning of Miranda
when he came to police station for questioning in response
to police request). Indeed, Judge Moylan felt a need to
note that, although Miranda is only a shriveled skeleton
of its former self, it "is not technically dead." Vines v.
State, 40 Md. App. 658, 664, 394 A.2d 809, 812 (1978)
(Moylan, J., concurring).
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ment that warnings be given in consent search
cases.8 7 The Court believes that such warnings
would hamper the "traditional function of police
officers in investigating crime." s Moreover, it re-
gards consent search situations "immeasurably far
removed from custodial interrogation," 9 in part
because it "occur[s] on the highway or in a person's
home or office, and under informal and unstruc-
tured conditions."
9
Despite the Court's position, consent in response
to police threats resembles answers made in custo-
dial interrogation more closely than it does consent
given absent a threat. First, in the consent-search
situation, the officer is seeking consent. The consent
in response to the police query is uncoerced only if
the officer conveys to the citizen a belief that the
citizen may refuse. Where an officer threatens the
citizen with a warrant, the officer is acting in a
coercive manner and conveys to the individual the
impression that a refusal is meaningless, the search
inevitable. The atmosphere created by the threat,
like that of the custodial interrogation, "suggests
the invincibility of law."91 Such threats to seek or
to obtain warrants closely resemble the psycholog-
ical coercion regarded as evil in Miranda.92 The
threats may be "psychological forces as potent and
effectual in achieving a 'consent' as the traditional
techniques and familiar instruments of physical
persuasion." 93
Second, while the threats to seek or to obtain
search warrants may not be made to citizens in
custody, where a policeman is threatening a citizen
it cannot be said that they are involved in a natural
interchange or informal setting.94
87 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231
(1973). For an identical state case holding, see People v.
Woolsey, 90 Cal. App. 3d 994, 153 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1979).




91 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966) (quot-
ing C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TION 99 (1956)).
92 384 U.S. at 448.
' Whitman v. State, 25 Md. App. 428, 336 A.2d 515
(1975).
94 This criticism was also made by Justice Marshall in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 288 (1973)
Finally, "the law relating to availability of a
warrant, the right to search, and the admissibility
of evidence seized is at least as confusing to the
layman as the law relating to oral admissions."
95
With consent searches, it is impossible to determine
the extent to which the consenting citizen premised
his consent upon the assumption that the police
search was inevitable.9 6 But where police threats
convey such an impression, it is certainly more
likely that the layperson will possess this belief.
Because consent came only after the police threat,
the potential coercion is more apparent. Conse-
quently, a citizen is in greater need of protection
when the police make threats to seek or to obtain
warrants. Warnings would provide such protection
and also would provide a more objective means of
determining whether there was consent in response
to such a police threat.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has never -addressed the
question of whether coercion invalidating consent
to search is present when such consent is granted
in response to police threats to seek or to obtain a
search warrant. A broad reading of Bumper v. North
Carolina indicates that coercion exists in many of
these situations. An examination of five alterna-
tives to the present majority view upholding con-
sent in response to police threats to seek or to
obtain a warrant shows protection of the consent-
ing individual may be afforded only by the prohi-
bition of such threats or by accompanying the
police threats with required warnings.
THOMAS G. GARDINER
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See Note, The Doctrine of Waiver
and Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 891,902 (1974).
The argument applies more forcefully when consent is
made in response to police threat to seek or to obtain a
warrant than where consent occurs after the police merely
request permission to search.
5 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
240.2, commentary at 534 (1975).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp.
633 (D. Del. 1968).
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